The series Rethinking Kant bears witness to the richness and vitality of Kantian studies. The series offers an alternative publishing venue of the highest quality, attractive to scholars who want to reach a readership of specialists and non-specialist alike. The collection is unique in its kind, for it garners papers from a whole generation of Kantian thought, ranging from doctoral students and recent PhDs to well-established thinkers in the field. This is the third volume in the series. It contains papers (...) from three regional study groups of the North American Kant Society, and thus takes the pulse of current Kantian scholarship. (shrink)

Formal learning theory is the mathematical embodiment of a normative epistemology. It deals with the question of how an agent should use observations about her environment to arrive at correct and informative conclusions. Philosophers such as Putnam, Glymour and Kelly have developed learning theory as a normative framework for scientific reasoning and inductive inference.

Urban street trees (USTs) have a range of values – some of which are easier to quantify than others. Focusing specifically on the UK context and using the Sheffield Tree Protests (2012–) as a case study, whilst confirming existing research as to the variety of values associated with their specifically ‘cultural’ services, the article argues that USTs have an additional potential form – what I call ‘civic-transformative value’. This form of value has at least three key characteristics. Firstly, it is (...) place-based and communal; second, its form is ‘relational’; and finally, as intrinsically contingent, it is pluralistic in the sense that its civic-transformative potential is dependent on successfully integrating a range of other values. The article emphasises both the possibility and necessity of ‘convergence’ – that is, a pluralistic and pragmatic alliance of values which might help protect not only USTs, but other embattled sites of nature. (shrink)

The paper deals with the question of the structure of knowledge and the precise relationship between propositional "knowledge that" and dispositional "knowledge how." In the first part of my essay, I provide an analysis of the term 'knowing how' and argue that the usual alternatives in the recent epistemological debate – knowing how is either a form of propositional or dispositional knowledge – are misleading. In fact it depends on the semantic and pragmatic context of the usage of this term (...) whether 'knowing how' refers to a type of dispositional knowledge, to propositional knowledge, or to a hybrid form of both. Only in the first case, can one say that dispositional know how cannot be reduced to any form of propositional knowledge. Yet, this case is the most interesting one to consider in the investigation of the nature of knowledge, if one assumes that knowing that p presupposes "having found out that p." Having found something out, however, presupposes certain acts of epistemic inquiry and corresponding epistemic abilities. Examined more carefully, it is shown that the dispositional knowledge-how is a necessary condition for propositional knowledge-that, hence propositional knowledge-that is a species of the dispositional knowledge-how. Accordingly, dispositional knowledge has to be understood as being at the very core of our notion of knowledge, including propositional knowledge. (shrink)

A distinction between different notions of “structure” and “function” is suggested for interpreting the overwhelming amount of data on microbiome structure and function. Sequence data, biochemical agents, interaction networks, taxonomic communities, and their dynamics can be linked to potential or actual biochemical activities, causal roles, and selected effects, respectively. This conceptual clarification has important methodological consequences for how to interpret existing data and approach open questions in contemporary microbiome research practice. In particular, the field will have to start thinking about (...) notions of function more directly. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/j5pq5uGld1k. (shrink)

ArgumentThe nineteenth century witnessed the advent of the modern zoo. Nearly everyone who came to watch the exotic animals was a “lay person” in the sense that virtually none had formal training in zoology. This paper provides a typology of these observers: the zoo directors, assistants, keepers, animal painters, and the “common” visitor. What did they observe and what were their motivations? Did they pursue a certain agenda? What kind of knowledge, if any, did they produce? Soon the issue of (...) the reliability of these observations emerged. Lay observers insisted on the veracity of their intimate and personal knowledge of animals while academics complained that their claims could not be generalized and were tainted by anthropomorphism. Hence the focus on the observations of these laymen will reveal contemporary assumptions on what may count as “scientific.” This is closely linked to the question of how far the zoo may qualify as a site of scientific investigation in the first place. The constraints on doing research on animals in a public space such as the zoo were numerous. Yet despite these obstacles the zoological garden contributed to the rise of ecological thinking as well as to the formation of ethology as a scientific discipline. (shrink)

How is metaphysics related to the empirical sciences? Should metaphysics in general be guided by the sources, methods and results of the sciences? And what about the special case of the metaphysics of the social world: should it likewise be guided by the sources, methods and results of the social sciences? In her paper “Social Science as a Guide to Social Metaphysics?”, K. Hawley raises the question: If we are sympathetic to the project of naturalising metaphysics, how should we approach (...) the metaphysics of the social world? She proceeds by discussing three approaches to social metaphysics: inference to the best explanation from current social science, descriptive conceptual analysis, and normative, especially ‘ameliorative’ projects. At the end of her discussion, she reaches a rather pessimistic conclusion, especially as regards the IBE approach: “a number of phenomena indicate that the prospects for securely basing social metaphysics via inference to the best explanation from social science are currently faint. […] We need to look elsewhere if we are to develop a metaphysics of the social world.” In my comments on her paper, I try to re-animate the program of an inductive metaphysics by defending the idea that the method of inference to the best explanation should be the central method of justification for metaphysics in general and for social metaphysics in particular. (shrink)

Suppose a fire broke out in a fertility clinic. One had time to save either a young girl, or a tray of ten human embryos. Would it be wrong to save the girl? According to Michael Sandel, the moral intuition is to save the girl; what is more, one ought to do so, and this demonstrates that human embryos do not possess full personhood, and hence deserve only limited respect and may be killed for medical research. We will argue, however, (...) that no relevant ethical implications can be drawn from the thought experiment. It demonstrates neither that one always ought to let the embryos die, nor does it allow for any general conclusion concerning the moral status of human embryos. (shrink)

Islamic philosophy has often been treated as being largely of historical interest, belonging to the history of ideas rather than to philosophical study. This volume successfully overturns that view. Emphasizing the living nature and rich diversity of the subject, it examines the main thinkers and schools of thought, discusses the key concepts of Islamic philosophy and covers a vast geographical area. This indispensable reference tool includes a comprehensive bibliography and an extensive index.

In this paper I examine the question whether Spinoza can account for the necessity of death. I argue that he cannot because within his ethical intellectualist system the subject cannot understand the cause of her death, since by understanding it renders it harmless. Then, I argue that Spinoza could not solve this difficulties because of deeper commitments of his system. At the end I draw a historical parallel to the problem from medieval philosophy.

North Korea is under strict UN economic sanctions because it violated UN policy in its development of nuclear weapons and long range missiles as well as for its militant rhetoric. South Korea and Japan, as close allies of the USA, are unsure of the future. Is there a way to bring some peace and stability to the Korean peninsula? Some argue that this is a hopeless task as long as the current leadership of North Korea is in power. This article (...) takes a more positive stance and outlines a possible way forward. The study, following the position of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, assumes that the conflict is at root one over ideology and power. The leadership of North Korea understands itself as “a revolutionary and socialist state” and is determined to continue to control the country through a rigorous and sometimes brutal government oversight of the culture. Although poverty and hunger are widespread, the people have little opportunity to be heard. What if the leaders of North Korea were persuaded that they could gain legitimacy through developing a dynamic economy that brought flourishing to their people and respect by fellow-nations in the global village? The article proposes to start this new adventure by developing enterprise zones in the North that would bring jobs and food to hundreds of thousands of North Koreans. To begin this project, there would need to be dramatic steps toward denuclearization on the part of the North in order to relax the UN economic sanctions. Is it possible? The article outlines a way forward. (shrink)

Vier Entwicklungtendenzen des Verhältnisses von Natur und Technik betreffen industrielle Gesellschafen als Ganzes: 1. der zunehmende Naturferne Technik, 2. zunehmende Naturnähe der Technik, 3. vermehrte Hybridzustände von Natur und Technik und 4. zunehmende Eindringtiefe der Technik in die Natur. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser teils gegenläufigen Tendenzen kann von Grenzen der Technisierung in industriellen Gesellschaften nicht im Allgemeinen, sondern nur in Bezug auf besondere Kontexte gesprochen werden. Zu ihnen gehört die Lebenswelt als ein nichtprofessioneller der und privater Erfahrungsbereich, es immer noch (...) erlaubt, kulturwirksam zwischen Natur und Technik zu unterscheiden. Zwei Beispiele werden diskutier: Die Wahrnehmung des Leibes, der sich als das lebensweltliche Zentrum das Natur erweist, sensibel auf Technisierungen reagiert, und der die Grenzen der Technisierung Reproduktion. Abschließend werden Gründe dafür angeführt, warum die Lebenswelt gegenüber Technisierungen, deren bevorzugtes Objekt sie ist, bisher in erstaunlicher Distanz geblieben ist. (shrink)